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ABSTRACT
The following is a case study of the University of New Orleans Disaster Resistant
University project. The Disaster Resistant University project involved the creation,
adoption, and implementation of an all-hazards campus mitigation plan. On August 29,
2005 Hurricane Katrina struck the City of New Orleans. This disaster caused the need
for a reassessment of the original campus mitigation plan. Both the original plan, and its
reassessment, are the subject of this case study.
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INTRODUCTION

Disasters increasingly affect higher education institution communities. They
sometimes cause death or injury, but always pose monetary losses and disruption of
the institution’s teaching, research, and public service. For example, in June 2001,
Tropical Storm Allison overwhelmed the Houston Area universities and colleges with 10
to 24 inches of rain. Texas at Houston Medical School Building had 22 feet of water in it,
causing the hospital to close for the first time in its history and damages to the Medical
School has been estimated at more than $205 million. In January 1994, the Northridge
earthquake damaged three universities in the Los Angeles area. All of the California
State University, Northridge buildings were damaged and the university was forced to
close for an entire month. The university reopened with 450 temporary trailers serving
as the only classrooms. Damages totaled over $380 million. In 1992, Hurricane Andrew
caused $17 million in damage to the University of Miami. The campus was forced to
close for almost one month because there was no water or electricity. The university
even had to purchase round-trip tickets to send students home during the hiatus.
University insurance premiums went up dramatically after the storm. Losses such as
these could be substantially reduced or eliminated through comprehensive pre-disaster
planning and mitigation actions (Building a Disaster-Resistant University, 2003, p.iii-3).
To compensate for losses incurred from disasters, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) has awarded millions of dollars in disaster assistance to
public and private universities and colleges throughout the United States over the last
decade. FEMA subsequently developed an initiative to help universities and colleges
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avoid future property and economic damage from disasters known as the Disaster
Resistant University project (DRU). The goal of a disaster-resistant university is to
create a campus with the ability to withstand the effects of probable hazard events
without unacceptable losses or interruptions, by mitigating against future disasters.
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 caused many communities to review
their disaster plans and begin to reconsider issues such as safety and security. Since
higher education institutions are themselves communities, the creation, adoption, and
implementation of an all-hazard campus-based mitigation plan will yield substantial
benefits.
In October 2004, UNO was granted the funds to participate in FEMA’s Disaster
Resistant University project. The ultimate goal of the plan is to identify and reduce risks
throughout UNO’s campus (UNO DRU Grant Proposal, 2004, pp.1-6). Before the plan
was officially adopted, the City of New Orleans was struck by Hurricane Katrina. The
impact of Hurricane Katrina on the City of New Orleans and UNO created the need for
reassessment of the plan post-disaster.
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CHAPTER 1
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
Overview
Natural and human-caused disasters increasingly pose monetary losses and
disruption to university communities throughout the United States. These losses could
be substantially reduced or eliminated through comprehensive pre-disaster planning
and mitigation actions. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
developed an initiative to promote mitigation measures for universities throughout the
country, known as the Disaster Resistant University program (DRU). The University of
New Orleans applied for and received a DRU grant. Grant funds were used to develop a
comprehensive, all-hazards campus mitigation plan. Before the final plan could be
officially adopted and implemented, Hurricane Katrina struck the New Orleans area.
This caused the need for a reassessment of the original plan post-disaster, which is the
topic of this case study. Once a final, post-disaster plan is developed and implemented,
the knowledge discovered throughout the process can be used by other universities and
communities to assist with their own mitigation planning. Universities and communities
can reassess their own mitigation plans in light of the events and developments that
surround the University of New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. The purpose of this case
study is to examine the original creation of a campus mitigation plan, and its
reassessment post-disaster, in hopes of contributing knowledge and lessons learned for
future research and mitigation by other universities and communities.
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Background
Disasters, both natural and human-caused, have increasingly affected higher
education institution communities over the last decade. Disasters sometimes cause
death or injury, but always pose monetary losses and disruption of the institution’s
teaching, research, and public service. Damage to buildings and infrastructure result in
losses that can be measured in decreases in the number of faculty, staff, and students,
degree programs offered, and decreases in research funding. These losses could be
substantially reduced or eliminated through comprehensive pre-disaster planning and
mitigation actions (Building a Disaster-Resistant University, 2003, p.iii).
Hazard mitigation1 planning is a systematic, four-phased process for identifying
and implementing actions to reduce or eliminate loss of life, property, and function due
to natural and man-made hazards, including: organizing resources, hazard identification
and risk assessment, plan development, and mitigation plan adoption and
implementation. Phase one includes organizing resources necessary and available for
completing the project. Phase two involves the identification of hazards that pose a
threat to the campus and the assets that are most vulnerable to those hazards. Phase
three consists of the planning and development of a campus mitigation plan. Phase four
includes official adoption and implementation of the newly developed campus mitigation
plan. Emergency Management also consists of four phases: mitigation, preparedness,
response, and recovery. Phase one, mitigation, refers to activities that eliminate or
reduce the chance of occurrence of the effects of disasters. Phase two, preparedness,
includes the development of plans and preparations made to save lives and property

1

Hazard mitigation is defined as any sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to life
and property from a hazard event (FEMA).
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and to facilitate response operations. Response, the third phase, includes actions taken
to provide emergency assistance and effective recovery immediately following a
disaster. The final phase, recovery, includes actions taken to return to normal or
improved operating conditions post-disaster (Building a Disaster-Resistant University,
2003, p.1-3).
To compensate for losses incurred from disasters, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) has awarded millions of dollars in disaster assistance to
public and private universities and colleges throughout the United States over the past
ten years. Losses include measurable interruptions to their instruction and auxiliary
services, including hospitals or sports arenas, and immeasurable losses to research
and the generation of knowledge. FEMA subsequently developed an initiative to help
universities and colleges avoid future property and economic damage from disasters
known as the Disaster Resistant University project (DRU). The goal of a disasterresistant university is to create a campus with the ability to withstand the effects of
probable hazard events without unacceptable losses or interruptions. These higher
education institutions recognize the threats posed by natural and human-caused
hazards to their campuses and missions and formulate policies, programs, and
practices to assess the risk and implement these across all of its teaching, research,
and public services activities. Therefore, the institution strives to be resilient. This does
not mean that there will be no damage from disasters, since the amount of damage
from natural and human-caused disasters varies by force and location of the event.
However, a disaster-resistant university mitigates this damage (Building a DisasterResistant University, 2003, p.1).
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Statement of Purpose
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, many communities
reviewed their disaster plans and began to reconsider issues of safety and security.
Higher education institutions are themselves communities, and can draw on important
lessons from the efforts of federal, state, and local agencies and organizations to
reduce disaster risks. The addition or improvement of an all-hazard campus-based
mitigation plan will yield substantial benefits. Regardless of an institution’s mission or
focus, hazard mitigation is an important investment (Building a Disaster-Resistant
University, 2003, p.2).
On October 30, 2000, President George W. Bush signed the Disaster Mitigation
Act of 2000. This Act requires state and local governments to create a hazard mitigation
plan that must be approved by FEMA. The law encourages and rewards local and state
pre-disaster planning, promotes sustainability as a strategy for disaster resistance, and
is intended to integrate State and local planning with the aim of strengthening statewide
mitigation planning. This collaborative approach facilitates cooperation among state and
local authorities, prompting them to work together. Colleges and universities can plan
for the reduction of hazard losses in conjunction with similar planning efforts within their
host community and/or state (Building a Disaster-Resistant University, 2003, p.1).
In accordance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, the City of New Orleans
developed the Orleans Parish Hazard Mitigation Plan, which was approved by FEMA in
early 2006. Vulnerability studies conducted by the City prior to Hurricane Katrina
illustrated that New Orleans is extremely vulnerable to a myriad of disasters, some of
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which include flooding, hurricanes, tornadoes, strong storms, hail, subsidence, drought,
levee failure, epidemics, acts of terrorism and nuclear accidents (Orleans Parish Hazard
Mitigation Plan, 2006, pp.1-25). These vulnerabilities were further exemplified when
Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans on August 29, 2005. Also subject to these disasters
is the University of New Orleans (UNO), and nine other major universities and colleges
located throughout the City of New Orleans.
Natural and human-caused disasters not only produce damaging effects to
university and college campuses, they also cause monetary impact to the city and state
in which the institution resides. For example, UNO has a substantial influence on the
economy of the City of New Orleans as well as the State of Louisiana. The University
employs 1,541 faculty and staff making it the 19th largest employer in Louisiana. The
contribution of UNO to the community is also emphasized by the fact that the majority of
all UNO graduates remain in the New Orleans area after graduation (University of New
Orleans Catalog, 2004, p.7).
Overall, effects of a disaster extend far beyond the university community, and
impact the City of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana. Considering the large
academic population and the economic impact and potential hazards that face the City
of New Orleans, UNO has successfully sought funding from FEMA to reduce and
manage their vulnerability to these disasters. In October 2004, UNO was granted the
funds to participate in FEMA’s Disaster Resistant University project, which involves the
development and implementation of a comprehensive all-hazards campus mitigation
plan. In January 2005, a mitigation plan was started. Although the plan targets natural
hazards, it also focuses on multiple hazards, including those that are human-caused,
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whether intentional or accidental. The ultimate goal of the plan is to identify and reduce
risks throughout UNO’s campus (UNO DRU Grant Proposal, 2004, p.1-6). Before the
plan was officially adopted, the City of New Orleans was struck by Hurricane Katrina.
The impact of Hurricane Katrina on the City of New Orleans and UNO created the need
for reassessment of the plan post-disaster, before a final plan can be officially adopted
and implemented.

Description of the Area of Study
The University of New Orleans was established by the Louisiana Legislature in
1956. It was created to bring public-supported higher education to the state’s largest
urban community. The Board of Supervisors acquired a 195-acre site in New Orleans,
Louisiana on the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain. The property was a former United
States Navy air station (University of New Orleans Catalog, 2004, p.7).
A number of the buildings remaining on the property were renovated for
academic purposes during the winter and spring of 1958. In September 1958, Louisiana
State University in New Orleans opened. It was renamed the University of New Orleans
in 1974. By 1962, the University was operating as a full four-year, degree-granting
institution. Today, programs of study are offered through six academic undergraduate
colleges, including Business Administration, Education and Human Development,
Engineering, Liberal Arts, Sciences, and Urban & Public Affairs. There is also a
Graduate School and a Metropolitan College. The Metropolitan College offers
educational extension, professional development, and international education activities
(University of New Orleans Catalog, 2004, p.7).
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The main campus now consists of 200 acres that include an arena with the
seating capacity for 10,000 people, sports facilities, and one administrative building.
UNO is a public university with an approximate enrollment of 17,000 students (13,000
undergraduates and 4,000 graduate students) resulting in its ranking as the largest
public university in the City and the second largest in the State. The student body is
diverse with 56% white, 22.3% black, 6% Hispanic, 5% Asian, and approximately 800
international students (www.uno.edu, 2005). The University grants bachelor degrees in
47 programs, Master’s Degrees in 38 areas, and Doctorates in 12 areas (University of
New Orleans Catalog, 2004, p.7).
The University of New Orleans is classified as a Southern Regional Education
Board Four-Year II institution, as a Carnegie Doctoral/Research Intensive University,
and as a Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Level VI institution. It is a
member of the Louisiana State University System. The University of New Orleans has
become a comprehensive urban university that provides academic support for the
enhancement of the educational, economic, cultural, and social well-being of the New
Orleans metropolitan area (University of New Orleans Catalog, 2004, p.7).

Why UNO Applied for the Disaster-Resistant University Grant
The University of New Orleans has created and implemented emergency plans in
case of a hurricane, fire, bomb threats, and other disasters that could affect the
University. However, no comprehensive all-hazards mitigation plan existed. Lack of a
comprehensive all-hazards mitigation plan increased the University’s vulnerability to
hazards, put the students, faculty and staff in danger of a natural or human-caused
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disaster, and potentially cost the University millions of dollars in lost research projects
and damaged infrastructure. Therefore, when the Disaster-Resistant University Grant
was first proposed to the UNO Center for Hazards Assessment, Response, and
Technology (CHART), the University’s Chancellor agreed that it was time for a
comprehensive campus emergency plan to be developed. Moreover, the creation of the
plan gives the University an opportunity to improve the campus and promote
sustainability.
Furthermore, UNO would have the potential to provide an opportunity to raise
risk awareness and reduce the disaster losses through mitigation planning and
mitigation actions. The plan would also support prior efforts made by UNO to reduce its
vulnerability. In addition to the development of the plan, the University would have the
potential to seek out additional funding sources to further implement identified mitigation
activities. Even more funding is now available to the University post-Katrina through
Public Assistance Grants (PA) as well as Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP)
funds, but UNO must have a FEMA-approved plan before these funds can be received
(UNO DRU Grant Proposal, 2004, pp.1-17).

Assessment of the Plan Post-Disaster
The original draft of the University of New Orleans Hazard Mitigation Plan was
developed after a thorough Risk Assessment was conducted and a Vulnerability
Assessment was prepared. A team of UNO experts representing various offices and
departments including the Environmental Health and Safety Office, CHART, the College
of Urban and Public Affairs (CUPA), the Engineering Department, University
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Administration (e.g., Chancellor’s Office, Facilities Services, and Human Resources),
Faculty Senate, and Student Government participated in these activities. Input from
other members of the faculty and the staff, as well as students, was included. Also
included in the planning efforts were the New Orleans Emergency Manager, Emergency
Medical Services, the State Hazard Mitigation Officer, local utilities, and local
organizations and agencies (UNO DRU Grant Proposal, 2004, pp.2-6).
Post-disaster, this draft must be reassessed with the actual impacts of Hurricane
Katrina in mind. Participants and key stakeholders must be re-visited. The Risk
Assessment and Hazard Vulnerability must be re-evaluated. Following thorough data
analysis and interpretation specifically relating to the post-disaster reassessment of the
original comprehensive campus mitigation plan, a final plan will be proposed, adopted,
and implemented after first-hand knowledge has been obtained and considered in wake
of a natural disaster that has recently struck and impacted the City of New Orleans and
UNO. The purpose of this case study is for other universities and communities to be
able to utilize UNO’s experiences with mitigation planning pre- and post-disaster
throughout the development of their own mitigation plans.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
The literature collected for purposes of this case study relates to disaster-resilient
communities and the characteristics and qualities that these communities encompass to
mitigate the effects of natural and human-caused disasters. Theories found throughout
the literature can easily relate and lend themselves to the formation of a disasterresistant university. An overview of the history of hazard mitigation and communities is
presented, followed by a description of the principles associated with disaster resiliency.
Next, the concepts of capacity, collaboration, education and outreach, and an ongoing
approach are discussed in regards to their impact on creating a long-term mitigation
plan. Other reassessments of mitigation plans are observed, as well as reconstruction
used as a tool for sustainable development of communities. Literature involving all of
these topics can therefore be used to theorize that if a university has the characteristics
of a disaster-resilient community, then it can be characterized as disaster resilient.

Hazard Mitigation and Communities
There is a long history of hazard mitigation planning in the United States.
Mitigation plans were first proposed by the noted geographer Gilbert White in a 1936,
Planners Journal article. Then, the Tennessee Valley Authority began helping
communities prepare flood prevention plans. These flood prevention plans originally
focused on corrective measures, but in 1956, began to include preventative measures

12

such as land-use regulations. By 1960, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers started
assisting communities across the country with the development of floodplain plans.
Most recently, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) initiated the
“Community Rating System” to offer community-wide reductions in flood insurance rates
in exchange for various local government actions to reduce losses from flood. To date,
many local governments participating in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
have prepared such plans (Burby, 1999, p.249).
Besides flood prevention, planning has also been advocated as an approach for
dealing with other natural and human-caused hazards. After the San Fernando
earthquake in 1971, the State of California began requiring local governments to
prepare a seismic safety element component as an addition to local comprehensive
plans. Florida and North Carolina now require that hurricane hazards be identified and
addressed in the preparation of local comprehensive plans. And in 1997, FEMA
launched Project Impact to gain attention to natural hazards at the local level (Burby,
1999, p.249).
In the gulf coast region, FEMA also promotes the development of local
comprehensive plans by distributing Public Assistance (PA) and Hazard Mitigation
Grant Program (HMGP) funds post-disaster to communities that had begun to develop a
mitigation plan pre-Katrina. These communities have one-year from the award date for
completion and approval of a mitigation plan, and then they are eligible to receive
government funding for mitigation measures identified throughout the planning process.
Since the University of New Orleans started its mitigation plan prior to Hurricane
Katrina, the University is eligible to apply for the additional funding as its own separate
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community. The original Disaster Resistant University mitigation plan must be
reassessed post-Katrina, and then approval by FEMA must be granted before funds can
be received and identified mitigation projects can be implemented (www.fema.gov,
2006).
Raymond J. Burby (1999, p.248) states that “planning programs reduce losses
by affecting both the location and design of urban development and by helping to create
a knowledgeable constituency of citizens who support hazard mitigation programs.” In
localities where hazardous areas have advantages for development that cannot be
foregone, such as New Orleans since it is a major U.S. port, planning programs help to
reduce potential losses by guiding development to the least vulnerable parts of the area
and by modifying pre-existing structures so that risk is reduced. To further limit this risk
after development has taken place, planning controls set standards to reduce the
magnitude of a disaster. Furthermore, by involving citizens in all phases of the planning
process, planning programs can help to raise citizen awareness of the risks posed by
natural and human-caused disasters. This helps to create a base of citizen support for
mitigation efforts and aims to combat the perceived risk complex2 (Burby, 1999, pp.247258).
“Recent reviews indicate that where they have been adopted, stand-alone plans
and the hazard mitigation elements of comprehensive plans have a positive effect in
fostering more robust local government hazard mitigation programs and a reduction in
property damage in natural disasters” (Burby, 1999, p.249). Despite this evidence,
some communities still do not adopt mitigation plans. This can be attributed to several

2

Perceived risk complex can be defined as a person’s perception of vulnerability to a disaster that is
much lower than is actually the case.
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factors such as failure of federal policies to enforce land-use regulations in hazard
zones, low perceived risk of loss from disasters, and that costs of avoiding risks by not
building in danger zones are immediate whereas the benefits of avoiding losses are
only realized at some future date after a disaster has taken place. As a result, hazard
mitigation planning is not attractive to many local governments or citizens. However,
when planning is undertaken in a community, comprehensive plans have the advantage
of taking into account a broader array of community goals, involving a large number of
citizens, and of discovering the potential for economic development and population
growth in less vulnerable areas (Burby, 1999, pp.247-258).

Disaster Resilience Principles
Communities are complex, dynamic systems in which social and technological
components interact. Disaster resilience requires combinations of opposites including
redundancy and efficiency, diversity and interdependence, strength and flexibility,
autonomy and collaboration, and planning and adaptability (Godschalk, 2002, p.5).
Harold D. Foster has identified thirty-one principles necessary for achieving resilience
(Godschalk, 2002, p.5). He organizes these principles into categories such as the
following: general systems, physical, operational, timing, social, economic, and
environmental. Others including Harold Foster (1997), Louise K. Comfort (1999),
Kathleen Tierney (2002), and Rae Zimmerman (2001) have studied the response of
resilient systems to disasters and find that they tend to be:
-

Redundant – with a number of functionally similar components so that the
entire system does not fail when one component fails;
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-

Diverse – with a number of functionally different components in order to
protect the system against various threats;

-

Efficient – with a positive ratio of energy supplied to energy already delivered
by a dynamic system;

-

Autonomous – with the capability to operate independently of outside control;

-

Strong – with the power to resist attack or outside force;

-

Interdependent – with system components connected so that they support
each other;

-

Adaptable - with the capacity to learn from experience and the flexibility to
change; and

-

Collaborative – with multiple opportunities and incentives for broad
stakeholder participation (Godschalk, 2002, pp.5-6).

Capacity
Burby (1999, pp.247-258) argues that local governments have used two
approaches in planning to cope with hazards. The first approach encompasses the
undertaking of hazard mitigation through stand-alone hazard mitigation plans. The
second approach involves hazard mitigation as one component of a broader
comprehensive plan for an entire jurisdiction or region. Stand-alone plans usually
involve greater technical details, but they also inadvertently promote increased
occupancy of vulnerable areas by making them safer for development. This occurs
since stand-alone hazard mitigation plans focus solely on the areas exposed to
hazards. Comprehensive plans have the advantage of taking into account a broader
array of community goals by involving a large number of stakeholders.
Comprehensive plans developed through a capacity building approach help a
community build internal resources to carry on its development plans with a minimum of
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outside assistance. A systematic view toward capacity building seeks to build capacity
of state and local governments to determine needs, seek solutions, process information,
change priorities, programs and procedures, provide feedback, and modify behavior on
the basis of evaluation (Honadle, 1981, pp. 575-580).
Capacity can be defined by the ability to do the following:
-

anticipate change;
make informed decisions about policy;
develop programs to implement policy;
attract and obtain resources;
manage resources; and
use current activities to guide future actions (Henstra, et al, 2004, pp.1-10).
Beth Walter Honadle (1981, pp. 575-580) argues that without the ability to

anticipate change, an organization is incapable of influencing the future. Whether and
how an organization responds to these signals, determines its influence on changes
that occur over time. Thus, capable entities have the ability to make policy decisions
based on organized, relevant information that influence their future. These entities
develop programs to implement these goal-oriented policies.
Honadle (1981, pp. 575-580) goes on to describe capacity in that organizations must
be able to attract resources from the environment. Resources include community
support and acceptance, as well as citizen participation in decision-making. The ability
to absorb resources may be difficult for small communities since not all organizations
have the ability to attract resources, as well as spend them. A community can obtain a
grant to perform a planning function or build a facility, but still lack in time, staff, skills,
and instruments need to effectively utilize available funds. Capable organizations have
the ability to attract and manage physical, human, informational, and financial
resources.

17

Furthermore, without a community’s use of capacity building, any mitigation effort
will likely be a one-time event. Thus, if capacity includes the ability to anticipate and
influence change, there must be an ongoing assessment of what the organization is
currently doing. This assessment should include:
-

monitoring performance;
evaluating how well measures are doing; and
assessing whether or not the current level of effort is appropriate over time
(Honadle, 1981, pp. 575-580).

Information obtained from an assessment can be used to improve future organizational
performance and must be utilized in order to effectively build capacity. Organizational
requirements for capacity include the following:
-

the ability to forge effective links with other organizations;
processes for solving problems;
coordination among disparate functions; and
mechanisms for institutional learning (Honadle, 1981, pp. 575-580).

The framework presented above also advocates approaches to capacity building that
favor the incorporation or institutionalization of capacity into the permanent structure of
the target locale. This suggests less direct involvement of consultants, circuit riders, and
similar external and transient actors in everyday administration, and focuses more on
transferring their knowledge, skills, and thoughts to local managers. Honadle (1981, p.
580) sums the capacity building approach up by stating, “if there is one thing that
capacity building does not mean, it is creating dependency on outsiders for expertise.”

Collaboration
The most effective way to assist a community in the creation of a successful
project is to utilize the skill and knowledge of specialists within the community and to
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collaborate with these diverse experts. James E. Austin (2000, pp.16-39) identifies key
components necessary for successful collaboration within a community, entitled the
Seven C’s of Strategic Collaboration. His criteria should be applied to community
mitigation planning and include:
-

Connection with purpose and people – alliances are successful when key
individuals connect personally;
Clarity of purpose – vagueness and ambiguity will cloud the vision of the
undertaking and may breed confusion or conflict;
Congruency of mission, strategy, and values – the closer the alignment, the
greater the potential gains from collaboration;
Creation of value – collaborations are about mobilizing and combining
multiple resources and capabilities to generate benefits, and systematically
focus on defining, balancing and renewing value;
Communication between partners – good communication is essential in
building trust, and trust is the intangible that makes collaboration cohesive;
Continual learning – partners should view alliances as learning laboratories
and cultivate a discovery ethic that supports continual learning, enabling
continual improvement; and
Commitment to the partnership – a strategic and sustainable alliance
institutionalizes the collaboration process while building a deep relationship
and long-term perspective (Austin, 2000, pp.16-39).

Education and Outreach
One of the greatest long-term challenges to disaster resistance is diminishing
interest in hazard mitigation. One of the most effective ways to maintain momentum on
mitigation planning and projects is to publicize progress and successes. By publicizing
the community’s plan and efforts at disaster resistance, implementation of goals and
priorities is more easily achievable. One of the FEMA DRU guidelines involves
initiatives aimed at public education and awareness. These initiatives may include
actions such as outreach projects, hazard information centers, and technical assistance
(Building a Disaster Resistant University, 2003, p.41).
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According to Tina-Marie Christian (2003, p.12), “the ultimate goal of participative
education is to create a critically shared consciousness of analysis and strategies, and
the recognition that each action is linked.” Through conscious critical analysis,
community members can determine that the process used to develop policy and
programs is linked to strategic planning that is influenced by the external and internal
environments. By involving as many stakeholders as possible, diverse threads of
knowledge and experiences become evident and contribute to the policy and planning
processes.
A major element of the effectiveness of emergency management is the degree of
ownership by the community. According to John Lunn (2003, p.44), “if something is
done ‘to’ the community, it will be less effective than something that is done ‘with’ or ‘by’
the community.” This principle remains true for all aspects of hazards policy.
Lunn (2003, pp.44-45) addresses two types of listening and community
consultation within risk management. One type is known as “covert listening” and is
currently used by many organizations within communities. Surveys, questionnaires, and
polls are examples of this approach. This is a typical example of organizations hearing
what they want to hear, but it does not necessarily represent the overall situation. Often,
pollsters or surveys simply tell the client what they want to hear and do not provide a
result that may hinder the organization’s reputation.
The second type of listening is known as “overt.” It is open and public listening
which provides a forum for people who want a voice. The fact that stakeholders want to
have a voice often means that they are passionate about the issues at hand. The basis
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of stakeholders views should not impair his or her chances of being heard (Lunn, 2003,
pp.44-45).
Covert and overt listening both have their place, benefits, and limitations within
hazard mitigation planning. Each form of listening forms part of an overall holistic
approach. Lunn (2003, p.44) states, “consideration of each needs to impact the other for
ultimate survival, growth, and prosperity.” Engaging campus stakeholders throughout
the mitigation planning process, provides for added opportunities of utilizing resources
and networks. This includes obtaining support from campus administrators, faculty,
staff, and students. Education and outreach should also extend to the surrounding
communities, municipality, and parish (Charvat, 2005, p.4). By informing and involving
stakeholders, support for mitigation planning and projects is increased and the
perceived risk complex is combated.

An Ongoing Approach
Dan Henstra (2004, pp.9-11) prescribes core elements that must be ongoing to
effectively design and develop a disaster resilient community. His model incorporates
the following concepts:
•

Cultural attitudes must accommodate resilience – Communities must realize and
accept that we cannot control many aspects of the hazard variable such as
timing, duration, and magnitude. Instead, community efforts should focus on
elements that are controllable, such as mitigating vulnerability to hazards,
reducing potential losses, and planning for speedy recovering in the aftermath of
a disaster. This concept allows communities to become more sustainable without
having to know what cannot be predicted.

•

Disaster resilience is a philosophy, a process and a condition – Disaster
resilience must be seen as an ongoing process and not just an ideal condition
that can be achieved and then forgotten. A holistic approach is required to
incorporate input from a broad range of stakeholders in order to develop a
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workable and lasting strategy that can be integrated into community long-term
plans and implemented with minimal resistance.
•

Resilience requires an all-hazards approach – An approach that includes natural
and human-caused hazards must be incorporated in order for a community to
become disaster resilient. A community should first identify potential hazards and
assess the level of risk for each.

•

Resilience requires an all-vulnerabilities approach – After hazards are identified,
community vulnerability must be identified and addressed. According to Henstra,
“vulnerability takes many forms, including physical vulnerability, social
vulnerability, economic vulnerability, and cultural vulnerability. Steps must be
take to reduce existing vulnerability, but current decisions and policies should not
augment or hinder future vulnerability (Henstra, p.10, 2004). Reduction of these
vulnerabilities is a consistent theme across various models. It must be reduced in
order to facilitate disaster resistance at the community level.

•

Communities require greater resistance to hazard stresses – A disaster resilient
community must incorporate a greater ability to resist or withstand stress
resulting from hazards. Existing buildings must be hardened to withstand disaster
damage, and regulations may need to be imposed on new construction.

•

Community systems must be flexible – Disaster resilient communities require
flexibility to absorb hazard stress without failure. Flexibility of systems can be
enhanced by building capacity through designing for uncertainty and by
incorporating diversity to reduce susceptibility to site-specific threats. Likewise,
policies such as land-use regulations and building codes should be flexible
enough to allow for adjustment and adaptation based on disaster experiences.

•

Recovery capacity must be enhanced – An essential component of a disaster
resilient community is the ability to recover quickly following a disaster. Recovery
is a complex process which occurs at many different levels. The ability to recover
quickly after a disaster relies on many variables such as individual recovery
capacity of households and businesses, financial resources, community
participation, and intergovernmental relations. To promote community
sustainability, disaster recovery should include rebuilding to reduce future losses
instead of simply fixing what was damaged. Planning for recovery can strengthen
flexibility in post-disaster decision-making and minimize discontinuity between
policy objectives.

•

Communities must develop an adaptive capacity – There will always be
uncertainty regarding hazards in our environment. This uncertainty can be
counteracted by developing an adaptive capacity and the flexibility to cope with
unanticipated events. The disaster resilient community concept incorporates an
adaptation element, which requires the adaptation of new polices and practices
based on lessons learned during the event (Henstra, pp. 9-11, 2004).
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The post-disaster period provides a window of opportunity for support for
mitigation policies as well as stronger disaster management policies. Since disasters
expose community vulnerabilities which may have not been originally identified, these
vulnerabilities can be noted and addressed in anticipation of a future hazard event
(Henstra, 2004, p.11).
Henstra’s (2004, pp.9-11) core concepts of ongoing disaster resilience as a
philosophy, process, and a condition and developing an adaptive capacity are extremely
applicable to UNO’s reassessment of its original campus mitigation plan post-Katrina.
The University Community realized the need to address vulnerabilities which were not
originally identified and then incorporate newly identified vulnerabilities into a final plan
to submit for approval by FEMA. FEMA further promotes the development of community
mitigation plans, by the eligibility of communities with plans to apply for HMGP and PA
grants.
Hurricane Katrina provides the most evident and prominent example of hazard
impacts which can be used to mitigate future damages through the reassessment of the
campus mitigation plan. David R. Godschalk (2002, p.2) states that “designed in
advance to anticipate weather, and recover from the impacts of natural or technological
hazards, resilient cities are based on principles derived from past experience with
disasters in urban areas.” He proposes a sustainable mitigation policy system where the
overall goal is developing a resilient community, capable of managing extreme events.
Godschalk envisions an intergovernmental system in which federal sustainable
development policy is implemented and FEMA regions help to create state and local
mitigation commitment and capacity. The various stakeholders, such as the University
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of New Orleans, prepare mitigation plans and carry out mitigation projects and actions
aimed at creating resilient communities. Henstra also advocated the drawing of lessons
learned from past events in mitigation planning. He notes that “one particularly useful
case study would be an analysis of how a community was impacted by and dealt with a
disaster event” (2004, p.19).

Other Reassessments
The reassessment of a community mitigation plan has previously been
performed in other areas around the world. In particular, the Caribbean islands of
Antigua, Barbuda, Dominica, St. Kitts, and Nevis have all participated in the Caribbean
Disaster Mitigation Project (CDMP). According to the December 1999 CDMP Progress
Bulletin (p.1), “while the preferred mode for providing technical assistance in disaster
mitigation is to incorporate vulnerability reduction measures into all aspects of
development projects, the reality is that often a disaster must strike before there exists
sufficient institutional and technical interest in mitigating against future losses.” The
CDMP was created for this purpose and provides disaster-affected members of the
Organization of American States (OAS) access to technical specialists to assist in the
design of mitigation activities and their incorporation into reconstruction plans and
projects (CDMP, 1999, pp.1-2).
Both Hurricanes Luis and Marilyn affected the Caribbean islands in 1995.
Following the passage of both hurricanes, the CDMP Regional Coordinator visited the
islands to discuss possible mitigation actions post-disaster. The Regional Coordinator’s
visit resulted in the development of a series of training workshops that would train local
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carpenters, artisans, builders, and homeowners in hurricane resistant construction. In
addition, three consultants were hired to share their expertise regarding structural
problems throughout these workshops. CDMP also prepared and printed booklets with
instructions for practical roof construction and retrofitting of existing buildings. More than
80 artisans and homeowners attended the workshops (CDMP, 1999, pp.1-2).
The overall response of these CDMP workshops was enthusiastic from both
homeowners and builders. Overall, people were willing to change their old building
practices based on what they were taught at the workshops. The booklets and training
materials enhanced and promoted the workshop teachings. After its initial successes,
the CDMP planned on possible future training initiatives including:
1) preparing training materials that address key issues and priorities;
2) building codes should exist that can be enforced by building inspectors
trained in disaster resistant construction;
3) provisions should be made to update training materials on a regular
basis;
4) organization of evening training workshops; and
5) invite local contractors by letter to participate (CDMP, 1999, p. 2).
As the above third initiative points out, the CDMP realized the need for regular
reassessments of its plans and objectives.

Reconstruction as a Tool for Sustainable Development
Ranganath (2000, p.2) defines mitigation as “a statement of intent or plan of
action to reduce significant hazard risks while incorporating sustainable values.” A major
goal of mitigation measures is to make a community sustainable. In order for this to
occur, it is necessary for land-use planning and hazard mitigation projects to promote
the avoidance of high-risk areas. Disasters tend to motivate people, provide the chance
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to alter the physical development patterns to reduce future hazard vulnerability, and
often lead to a comprehensive survey of vulnerable areas that provides a more accurate
understanding of hazard risks. This eases the initiation of long-term measures and new
development plans for that area. Surveys and reassessments of communities, such as
UNO, allow for damage assessments and pre-existing mitigation and development
plans to be reevaluated in retrospect of a disaster and in preparation of another.
Therefore, any assessment performed during reconstruction can be used as a tool to
make a community more disaster-resilient.

Conclusion
In summary, a disaster-resistant university is an ongoing process that must be
reassessed often, especially in post-disaster times, to promote efficiency and
effectiveness of mitigation measures. The ability to build capacity and collaboration
within a community, such as a disaster-resistant university, can further enhance and
promote the policies and procedures developed and implemented during the
community’s mitigation planning process. As Burby (1999, 247-258) states, UNO’s
undertaking of developing a comprehensive mitigation plan gives the university the
advantage of taking into account a broader array of community goals, involving a large
number of citizens, and of discovering the potential for economic development and
population growth in less vulnerable areas.
As Lunn theorizes (2003), by involving many stakeholders and listening to their
input, both covertly and overtly, chances of community acceptability and prosperity are
increased. Henstra’s (2004, pp.9-11) core concepts of ongoing disaster resilience as a
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philosophy, process, and a condition and developing an adaptive capacity provide
detailed guidelines and insight into the reassessment of UNO’s mitigation plan postKatrina. Tina-Marie Christian’s (2003) theory of participative education and Steven J.
Charvat’s (2005) theory of extending public outreach initiatives to surrounding
communities and area, both provide information to the university which can be used to
promote substantial benefits by helping to link actions of the policy and program
together and keeping the stakeholders and public informed.
In addition, lessons learned and best practices found by researching other
reassessments, such as the Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project, can also be used to
provide information for the revision of a pre-existing mitigation plan post-disaster
(CDMP, 1999, pp. 1-2). Periods of reconstruction, and the assessments that the period
yields, can be used as a tool to make a community more disaster-resilient. Ranganath
(2000, p.2) argues that a major goal of mitigation is to yield sustainable values
throughout a community. Since a major goal of mitigation measures is to make a
community sustainable, it is necessary for land-use planning and hazard mitigation
projects to promote the avoidance of high-risk areas.
UNO can utilize all of the above theories and incorporate them to promote its
own campus sustainability.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

Introduction
“Hurricane Katrina dealt a devastating blow to New Orleans and the University of
New Orleans” (Strategic Planning Survey email, Chancellor Timothy Ryan, February 15,
2006). The University has experienced sharp cuts in state funding and a significant
decline in self-generated revenues. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, UNO enrolled over
17,200 students. In Fall 2005, the University was able to enroll 6,900 students in online
courses. Spring 2006 enrollment was over 12,000 students and most classes were held
on the main Lakefront campus. Nevertheless, this projected loss of more than 2,000
students continues to have damaging impacts on the functioning of the University.
These factors, many of which could have been mitigated through the FEMA DRU
initiative, may force UNO to restructure and realign its academic programs and services.
The following chapter describes the methodology used to create the original campus
mitigation plan, as well as reassess the plan post-Katrina.

UNO Case Study - Methodology
The history of case study research is marked by periods of intense use and
disuse (Tellis, 1997, p.2). The earliest use of this type of research can be traced back to
Europe. The methodology in the United States was most closely associated with the
University of Chicago Department of Sociology, where various aspects of immigration of
different nation groups to the city were studied and reported on. A case study is done by
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giving special attention to the completeness in observation, reconstruction, and analysis
of cases under study. According to Winston Tellis (1997, p.3), “case study is done in a
way that incorporates the views of the ‘actors’ in the case under study.”
Although case studies are used throughout many areas, the field of sociology is
most strongly associated with this type of research. As a result of issues raised by
researchers in other fields, there was a movement to make the case study more
scientific. This meant providing some quantitative measurements to the research design
and analysis. After the use of quantitative methods was advanced, the decline of the
case study increased rapidly. In the 1960’s, there was a renewed interest in the case
study form of research when researchers were becoming concerned with the limitations
of quantitative methods (Tellis, 1997, p.3).
According to Tellis (1997, p.3), Yin explains that the case study can be
seen to satisfy the three tenets of the qualitative method: describing, understanding,
and explaining. This particular case study takes into account the development of a
comprehensive campus mitigation plan pre-disaster, and its reassessment postdisaster. Potential hazards affecting the University of New Orleans were identified
through the creation of a hazard profile which covered several aspects of campus-wide
mitigation strategies through field observation, focus group and interview discussions
pre-disaster. Post-Katrina, the vulnerabilities of the University were exposed, causing a
necessary reassessment of the mitigation plan post-disaster. Vulnerabilities and
hazards were reprioritized, new hazards were identified, and the plan was rewritten to
comply with FEMA’s DRU grant requirements as well as those outlined in FEMA’s
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community mitigation plan program. This allowed the University to be eligible for further
funding as a community entity.
The background and related history of UNO is given within the context of this
case study in order to create a clear understanding of the importance of this project. Yin
(2003) identifies the requirement for multiple methods of evidence; whereas through the
analysis of secondary data, the original and post-Katrina focus group discussions, and
key-informant interviews, this case study fulfills his concept of multiple methods.

Multiple Methods
A prime strength of case study research is the opportunity to use many different
sources of evidence (Yin, 2003). An increasing number of researchers are using multimethod approaches towards case studies, which is also known as “triangulation.”
Triangulation can be described as two or more different research methods used to
address the same issue in an effort to confirm findings and to obtain expanded depth of
information (Krueger, 1994). Throughout the triangulation process, a researcher may
use several methods in various combinations (Denzin & Lincoln, 1995). In this particular
case, the multiple methods that were used to create the original plan and reassess it
post-disaster included field observation, analysis and review of secondary, focus groups
discussions, advisory group meetings, and individual interviews.
Multiple methods used in triangulation are typically referred to as a combination
of observation, interview, and document review. In the UNO DRU case study, validation
was increased through direct observation of records and verification of findings during
focus group sessions and individual interviews, as well as on-site observation of the

30

damage to the University resulting from Hurricane Katrina. Findings or conclusions
resulting from a case study are likely to be convincing and accurate if they are based on
several different sources of corroboratory information (Yin, 2003). Multiple approaches
within a single case study are likely to exemplify or nullify some unrelated influences,
and likely to confirm and reiterate the related results as seen in the affirmation of similar
hazard concerns in the focus groups and interviews pre- and post-disaster (Stake,
1995).

Document Review
Yin (2003) explains that for many case studies, archival records, or secondary
data such as records, articles, and computer files, are relevant. Analysis of secondary
data was the initial step in the development of the University’s comprehensive campus
mitigation plan. Review of newspaper articles, Internet searches, records available from
the UNO Office of Risk Management and the State of Louisiana Office of Risk
Management, and hazard profiles composed by the City of New Orleans and the State
of Louisiana, provided ample information needed to start the DRU initiative at UNO.
Post-disaster, secondary data was again used to reassess the University’s
comprehensive campus mitigation plan. Statistics and records from the damage
resulting from Hurricane Katrina were observed and utilized to edit the mitigation plan.
Review of these documents helped reorganize the prioritization of potential hazards and
vulnerabilities to the University, and even brought some new threats, such as mold and
civil unrest, to the forefront.
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Fieldwork
Fieldwork and observation of the University were performed to analyze the
campus’ weaknesses both pre- and post-disaster. Yin states that in order to increase
the reliability of observational evidence, case study investigations should allow for the
use of multiple observers. By incorporating several observers, the validity of what is
observed can be strengthened and different viewpoints can be incorporated. Field visits
to the case study sites allowed for direct observation, thereby increasing the reliability of
observational evidence (Yin, 2003). Direct observation of damage to the campus postdisaster illustrated the dire need for adoption and implementation of the comprehensive
campus mitigation plan.

Focus Groups
A focus group is a group interview utilizing carefully planned discussion to
develop insight on a defined area of interest in an inviting environment. They usually
consist of five to ten people led by a skilled moderator. The moderator uses open-ended
questions that allow individuals to respond, comment, explain, and share experiences.
Each participant is welcomed to share his or her individual ideas and perceptions
throughout the discussion (Krueger, 1994).
After an extensive period of research and investigation, the UNO Research Team
held a mitigation plan focus group. The focus group consisted of four UNO Facility
Services workers, and was essentially a qualitative data gathering technique run by a
moderator who directed the participant interaction and inquiry in an open-ended
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manner. This resulted in an abundance of qualitative information and suggestions for a
comprehensive mitigation plan.
The same focus group was revisited post-Katrina. Again, the discussion was
open-ended and the prior information and suggestions were re-evaluated in light of the
recent disaster. New vulnerabilities were noted and old ones were re-prioritized. The
information obtained in the second round of this focus group was vital for the
reassessment of the UNO mitigation plan.

Individual Interviews
Individual interviews can provide another level of gathering data or a different
perspective on the research problem not available through focus groups. A principle use
of case study interviews is to obtain the description and interpretations of others. Those
offices interviewed during UNO’s reassessment include representatives from several
campus offices and departments: the Student Housing, the Center for Hazards
Assessment, Response and Technology (CHART), Environmental Health and Safety
Office, University Administration including the Chancellor’s Office, Facility Services,
University Computing and Communications, Lakefront Arena, Campus Police
(University of New Orleans’ Campus Mitigation Plan, 2006). In the reassessment of
UNO’s mitigation plan, the interviewees had similar concerns and suggestions as the
focus group participants. Post-Katrina, these concerns and suggestions were elevated
due to the disaster situation in New Orleans.
Interviews can be one of the most essential sources of case study information
(Yin, 2003). Interviews should be structured around a guided conversation rather than a
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question and answer session. Like focus groups, case study interviews should be
mostly open-ended in nature. The interviewer can ask the respondents for the facts and
opinions about the subject at hand. The interviewer may even ask the respondent for
his or her own insights into certain occurrences, which can lead to further inquiry and
discussion. Throughout an individual interview, respondents provide the interviewer with
insights into a matter and may suggest sources of evidence in favor of or in opposition
to the research subject.

34

Original Plan Development - Methodology
Upon receiving a Disaster Resistant University (DRU) grant from the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the University formed a DRU Research
Team and a DRU Advisory Committee. The Research Team consisted of five members
of UNO faculty and staff representing CHART, CUPA, the Environmental Health and
Safety Office, the College of Engineering, two Research Associates from CUPA, and
one graduate student from the College of Geography, all of whom worked together to
conduct the above-mentioned campus-wide mitigation activities.
University of New Orleans decided to develop local, “in-house” expertise in
disaster resiliency to ensure sustainability and build capacity at the University
Community level. Rather than contracting an external agency to develop the mitigation
plan, the DRU Research Team decided to utilize the disaster expertise already residing
within the UNO Community. At the same time, the DRU Researchers viewed it as
essential to use a methodology in developing a mitigation plan that would ensure
representation from a broad range of stakeholders.
Several members of the DRU Research Team conducted a risk assessment and
hazard analysis, which identified potential hazards that threaten UNO. Next, an
extensive hazard profile was created. The various hazards identified through the risk
assessment were prioritized based on the likelihood of occurrence, severity of the
hazard, and cost of damage to the University. This data provided the basis for the
original campus mitigation plan.
The Advisory Committee was comprised of a team of UNO experts representing
various campus offices and departments including the Environmental Health and Safety
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Office, the Center for Hazards Assessment, Response and Technology (CHART), the
College of Urban and Public Affairs (CUPA), University Administration including the
Chancellor’s Office, Academic Affairs, Facility Services, Human Resources, University
Computing and Communications, the Kiefer Lakefront Arena, and Campus Police.
These individuals were selected since they were already part of an established UNO
Emergency Preparedness Committee created by the Chancellor. They were also
already established within the UNO community and had experience dealing with past
campus emergency situations and operations and had a vested interest in trying to
mitigation events like those of the past. All of these entities met at an initial DisasterResistant University kick-off meeting in February 2005.
The Advisory Committee’s main role was to be available for continuing input and
participation during the DRU planning process and to assist the DRU Research Team.
The Advisory Committee provided the DRU Research team with important data during
committee meetings and reviewed and provided comments as the mitigation plan
chapters were developed. In addition to this, most of the Advisory Committee members
were interviewed on an individual basis to provide detailed information regarding the
vulnerabilities of their specific administrative departments, as well as identify any
potential mitigation measures.
A full Geographic Information System (GIS) map of the UNO main campus was
also developed. The map provided detailed information and descriptions of all buildings
on campus. The GIS map is a working map and readily supplies information to
emergency personnel about campus facilities and infrastructure. The map also provides
the locations of emergency responders and emergency response equipment, in addition
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to the location of hazardous materials present on campus. Following mitigation planning
efforts, this map would be made available to University Administration to assist in
maintaining the mitigation plan and to emergency responders in an effort to coordinate
response in the event of an emergency.
Next, a detailed inventory of campus assets was conducted. A vulnerability
assessment was done based on the created hazard profiles and the inventory of assets
of the University. This was completed using information provided by the UNO
Department of Property Control in addition to data collected on research facilities, etc.
The vulnerability assessment was used to determine what the actual risk is from an
identified hazard. It also allowed the DRU Research Team to estimate potential property
damage and monetary losses while assisting in the prioritizing of mitigation plan
components.
The vulnerability assessment revealed three critical structures: the Administration
Annex, the University Communications and Computing Center (UCC), and the Central
Utility Plant. These buildings were deemed critical by the Research Team since in the
event of a disaster, UNO would not be able to fully serve its faculty, staff, or students if
one of these structures was not functioning or available for use. Moreover, the
Administration Annex acts as a potential shelter for top University administrators during
certain disasters, the UCC houses all campus-wide communications equipment, and the
Central Utility Plant controls all of the University’s maintenance such as electricity and
air conditioning to all facilities on campus. An in-house University Engineer conducted
detailed engineering surveys of these critical buildings.
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Focus group discussions and individual interviews were conducted after the
hazard profiling and vulnerability assessments were completed. The focus group and
individual interviews provided opportunities to clarify alternative mitigation measures,
develop additional strategies, and prioritize strategies that were identified previously to
mitigate UNO against potential natural and human-caused hazards. The group
discussions and individual interview sessions seemed to yield similar focus and
outcome of concern. Most importantly, all those interviewed agreed that the University
of New Orleans has significant weaknesses to hazards that need to be addressed.
The DRU Research Team established and prioritized goals and objectives in
order to develop the original comprehensive campus mitigation plan. Actions were
identified to achieve mitigation goals and objectives. The focus was mainly on
prevention, protection of property and infrastructure, public education and programs,
emergency services, and identification of potential mitigation projects. A plan of action
was developed for implementation and maintenance of mitigation projects. Once the
plan was drafted, it was reviewed by the DRU Advisory Committee.
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Hurricane Katrina
On the morning of August 29, 2005, Katrina passed over the City of New Orleans
as a category 4 hurricane (www.noaa.org, 2006). Extreme winds and water surges
caused catastrophic damage along the entire Gulf Coast region. However, the high
winds and rainfall were only the beginning of ongoing problems resulting from the
disaster in Orleans Parish.
Within hours after the storm passed over the area, three levees failed in Orleans
Parish. One of the breeched levees was located along the London Avenue Canal, near
the southwest perimeter of the UNO Lakefront main campus. Waters flooded most of
the City, including parts of the campus. The University was surrounded by flood waters
for several weeks. The City of New Orleans and surrounding parishes were left without
power for over a month due to the widespread flooding and the extent of wind damage
to the electrical supplier, Entergy. On-campus electrical power was not restored for over
six weeks. Water entered some of the buildings on campus through roofs that had
blown off, broken windows, leaky seals, and from flooding. In some structures, such as
Lafitte Village and Bienville Hall (both residential facilities), water rose to over four feet.
Most of the flooding on campus was limited to the south and southwest perimeters,
which is approximately eight feet in elevation. There is a steep incline in elevation
towards the north ends of campus, so these areas were generally protected from flood
waters (Vice-Chancellor Joel Chatelain, 2006).
The water, high humidity, rising temperatures, combined with a lack of air
conditioning and humidity control, caused extensive mold growth throughout the
campus. Also, as search and rescue efforts were underway in New Orleans, people
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who were rescued from their rooftops by helicopter were dropped off on UNO’s campus
since it was high ground. The University suffered extensive damage due to civil unrest
from these evacuees dropped off on campus. Animals in search of dry land also made
their way on campus. Approximately two weeks later, Hurricane Rita passed over the
area causing further damage while delaying recovery efforts. A bad situation was simply
exacerbated due to these circumstances (Vice-Chancellor Joel Chatelain, 2006).
The experiences and lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina made it clear to the
University Community that new and improved mitigation practices were needed to
prevent future damage to the campus. The DRU Research Team, although working out
of a temporary office since the CHART office on the Lakefront main campus suffered
extensive mold damage, immediately began to work on reassessing the original
comprehensive campus mitigation plan in light of the events surrounding Hurricane
Katrina.

The Reassessment - Methodology
To assist with applying for Federal Emergency Management Agency funds made
available to the areas devastated by Hurricane Katrina, the University of New Orleans
contracted a private consultant with expertise in flood mitigation. The consultant was
hired to assist in identifying potential mitigation projects around campus, and to apply
for Public Assistance (PA) and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funds on
behalf of the University. Because of the evident overlap between the FEMA proposals
and DRU work, the consultant also devoted time to assist with CHART’s project. In
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addition, one of the requirements for communities receiving these funds from FEMA is
the development of an approved all-hazard comprehensive community mitigation plan.
Since the University of New Orleans had already begun its own mitigation
planning prior to Katrina, it was eligible to apply as its own community, making it
possible to apply for PA and/or HMGP grants. Now, the Disaster Resistant University
plan had to be formatted to fit within both the FEMA DRU and FEMA community
mitigation plan guidelines (www.fema.gov, 2006).
The DRU Research Team worked with the flood mitigation consultant to identify
possible mitigation projects for the main campus. This was done through several
comprehensive on-site visits and evaluations. Hazards in the original plan were also reprioritized and new ones were added. For example, the original plan had levee failure
as one of the last priorities. Unfortunately, this vulnerability was greatly increased as
made evident by Hurricane Katrina. Newly identified hazards, not mentioned in the
original plan, were added, including mold and civil unrest.
The reassessment continued with the revisiting of the original focus groups and
individual interviewees. These sources were able to provide follow-up information
regarding the various University departments and areas they represented. The focus
group participants and interviewees also reported on what actually happened postdisaster in regard to his or her original comments.
The campus mitigation plan morphed into a ten chapter document based on preexisting formats for community plans. Secondary data was used such as the newly
approved Orleans Parish Hazard Mitigation Plan (2006), the Louisiana State Hazard
Mitigation Plan (2005), and newspaper articles and reports on hazard incidents in the
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area. Existing University plans and programs were also reviewed during the planning
process. Reviewed items include all university emergency and evacuation plans
including the Bomb Threat Response Procedure, Bomb Scare Procedures, Significant
Rain Event Response Plan, Hurricane Preparedness Guidelines and Action Plan, and
the University FY 2006-2007 Capital Outlay Plan.
During the planning process, contacts were made with agencies and
organizations outside of the University Community (i.e. Red Cross, FEMA Region VI,
Salvation Army, Lakeview Civic Improvement Association, etc). A notice was sent to
each entity requesting their review of the reassessed draft plan. They were asked to
review the draft on the CHART website and were asked to provide insight and
comments, as well as any information regarding their own mitigation initiatives.
The DRU Research Team, in collaboration with the DRU Advisory Committee
and the flood mitigation consultant, considered a wide range of strategies that could
positively mitigate the impacts of the identified hazards, and developed alternatives.
Five general strategies were identified to reach the goals including property protection,
preventative, emergency services, structural projects, and public information. A chapter
of the new mitigation plan was devoted to each of these strategies. This was achieved
through several Committee meetings and correspondence.
Upon completion of the above methodology measures, the original plan had
been thoroughly reassessed. The final comprehensive campus mitigation plan was then
submitted to the State Board of Regents, the State of Louisiana Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness, and FEMA for official approval and adoption.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Introduction
Pre- and post-disaster, multiple methods were used to increase validity of this
case study. Multiple methods utilized include fieldwork, review and analysis of
secondary data, focus group discussions, and individual interviews. Generally, resulting
data is likely to be more accurate since it is derived from several different sources of
corroboratory information (Yin, 2003). Similar concerns about campus vulnerabilities
were noted from the focus group discussions and individual interviews in the planning
process for the original comprehensive campus mitigation plan. Following Hurricane
Katrina, similar concerns were again identified during the reassessment of the plan.
This helped to increase the validity of the case study results and findings.
The ability to build capacity and collaboration within a community such as the
University of New Orleans can further enhance and promote the policies and
procedures developed and implemented during the campus mitigation planning
process. Theories developed by social scientists such as Raymond J. Burby, Dan
Henstra, John Lunn, David Godschalk, and Beth Walter Honadle are researched and
utilized due to their relevance to the formation of a disaster-resistant university. The
concepts of capacity, collaboration, education and outreach, and an ongoing approach
are necessary components to develop and create a long-term campus mitigation plan.
Reassessments of other mitigation plans and studies of reconstruction used as a tool
for sustainable development of communities provided background information, lessons
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learned, and best practices which aided in the University of New Orleans’ reassessment
of its campus mitigation plan.
Literature involving all of these topics is used to theorize that if a university has
the characteristics of a disaster-resilient community, then it can be characterized as
disaster resilient. Utilizing these theories and concepts within a university atmosphere
ultimately creates disaster-resiliency. A disaster-resistant university is an ongoing
process that must be reassessed often, especially in post-disaster times. By doing this,
efficiency and effectiveness of mitigation measures is promoted campus-wide.
The following data analysis and interpretation relates specifically to the postdisaster reassessment of the original comprehensive campus mitigation plan.

Data Analysis: Document Review
Post-Katrina statistics and records from the damage resulting from the disasters
in New Orleans were observed and utilized to reassess the original mitigation plan.
Secondary data was used to increase validity and included the newly approved Orleans
Parish Hazard Mitigation Plan (2006), the Louisiana State Hazard Mitigation Plan
(2005), and newspaper articles and reports on hazard incidents in the area. In addition
review of newspaper articles from the Times-Picayune, Lexis-Nexis database, Internet
websites such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the UNO
risk management claim files was included to verify campus vulnerabilities following the
disaster. Other reviewed secondary data included all University emergency and
evacuation plans including the Bomb Threat Response Procedure, Bomb Scare
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Procedures, Significant Rain Event Response Plan, Hurricane Preparedness Guidelines
and Action Plan, and the University FY 2006-2007 Capital Outlay Plan.
Additional secondary data was collected from agencies and organizations
outside of the University community. Because of their relevance to the University, both
in terms of the services provided or their nearby location, the following agencies and
organizations were contacted and asked to provide information regarding their own
mitigation initiatives, as well as their comments and insights for the reassessed UNO
mitigation plan:
Agencies
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Entergy
Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VI
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness
National Flood Insurance Program
New Orleans Department of Transportation and Development
New Orleans Sewerage & Water Board
Orleans Parish Emergency Management
Orleans Levee Board
Orleans Parish School Board
Regional Transit Authority
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Organizations
1.
Ben Franklin High School
2.
Lakeview Civic Improvement Association
3.
Lakeview Crime Prevention District
4.
LSU Cooperative Extension Services
5.
National Weather Service
6.
New Orleans Soccer Academy
7.
Southeast Louisiana American Red Cross
8.
Salvation Army
9.
Tulane University Emergency Management
Data obtained from secondary sources helped verify the natural and human-caused
hazards that could potentially impact the University of New Orleans (UNO), aided in the
reprioritization of hazards, and provided background and historical information pertinent
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to each individual hazard. In particular, the prioritization of levee failure within the flood
and wind hazards discussions, was very low on the list in the original campus plan. The
effects of Katrina and the three resulting levee breaks in Orleans Parish led to this
hazard ranking higher in the priority list. After the reassessment, termites, epidemics,
mold, and civil unrest were all added to the original plan’s hazard list (University of New
Orleans Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2006)

Data Analysis: Fieldwork
Several post-disaster, on-campus visits provided information regarding the
vulnerabilities of the University main Lakefront campus and the East campus. Damage
incurred from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita exemplified previously identified campus
vulnerabilities and concerns. New vulnerabilities and hazards were also exposed.
Information gained also made evident the need for the reprioritization of vulnerabilities
after incorporating those that were newly developed. Data obtained from the fieldwork
helped to identify and verify certain campus weaknesses, provide the opportunity to
photograph and document damage to the campus following a major disaster, and
created the foundation for the development of future mitigation projects.
On-site visits aided in the documentation of the effects from hazards. Several
photographs were taken and incorporated into the revised University mitigation plan.
These photos included pictures of flood and wind damage, mold damage, and damage
from termites. Photographs of the campus buildings were also added. The fieldwork
conducted by the Research Team provided for a visualization of the impacts from the
hazards described in the new mitigation plan.
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Data Analysis: Focus Groups
The original focus group session was held in June 2005, two months prior to
Hurricane Katrina. Participants included UNO Facility Services experts who had been
employed by the University for several years. Questions were asked that focused on
past disasters around campus, identification of possible mitigation strategies, and any
additional input from the participants.
In February 2006, the post-disaster focus group session was held. A majority of
the same Facility Services experts participated. Questions asked during this session
focused on Hurricane Katrina impacts on the campus, the identification of new
vulnerabilities and hazards, and the identification of additional mitigation strategies. At
this time, information obtained from the pre-disaster session was also re-evaluated. This
allowed for clarification of any previous comments or suggestions in light of Hurricane
Katrina.
Information gained from the revisiting of the focus groups provided references
used in the reassessed plan regarding the hazard descriptions, property damage, and
threat to people sections. Focus group participants provided their insights and past
experiences with the listed hazards. This data provided the majority of the content used
throughout the hazard descriptions in Chapter 2 of the revised plan.

Data Analysis: Individual Interviews
Original interviewees were revisited to provide follow-up information regarding
the various University departments and areas that they represented. Each individual
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was provided with a transcript of his or her first interview, and was asked to report on
what actually happened post-disaster in regard to the original responses and
comments.
Additional interviews were conducted involving particular University
Administrators who played a vital role in the response and recovery efforts following
Katrina. Information obtained from these interviews was extremely vital during the
reassessment of the original campus mitigation plan, since these individuals witnessed
first-hand the damage and campus situation resulting from the storm.
Post-Katrina information gathered during the continuation of the original
individual interviews included the identification of civil unrest and mold as additional
hazards to the University. These interviews also raised several questions regarding
what the actual role of the University should be to the community during a disaster. In
addition, several storm stories aided in the formation of future mitigation projects for the
University. Of particular importance is the newly identified “North Campus Plant”
mitigation project, which involves either the construction of a new building or the
retrofitting of a pre-existing structure to contain a University co-generation plant and
“safe house” for University first-responders and other emergency responders (ViceChancellor Joel Chatelain, 2006). UNO planned to apply for HMGP grant funds to cover
a portion of the cost of this project.
The North Campus Plant mitigation project is of extreme importance because of
its ability to help reduce the ongoing effects resulting from disasters. The co-generation
plant within the structure would essentially provide back-up power for the entire main
campus. Therefore, if the University lost its power, the generator would start providing
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emergency back-up power. Buildings on campus would always have air conditioning,
which would prevent or limit the spread of mold in the event of flooding, ensure the
continuation of University operations due to functioning computer systems, and prevent
additional losses such as perishable items including foods and University biology
projects and test samples. In addition, the North Campus Plant would be able to house
several campus representatives and other emergency personnel. By having people on
campus at all times during and immediately following a disaster, civil unrest would be
less of a threat for UNO (Vice Chancellor Joel Chatelain, 2006).

Interpretation of the Data
Data gained through the use of multiple methods, also known as the process of
triangulation, provided the information needed to effectively reassess the original UNO
comprehensive campus mitigation plan post-disaster. Statistics and records from
damage incurred from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were observed and utilized to edit
the original plan. Review of pre-existing and new documents, as well as the revisiting of
the focus group and individual interview participants, helped the DRU Research Team
reorganize the prioritization of hazards and vulnerabilities to the University, and even
made evident two new threats: mold and civil unrest.
Hazards were identified and categorized into two types: natural and humancaused. The list of hazards follows:
Natural Hazards
Floods3
Wind4
Hail
3
4

Hurricanes are included in the description of these hazards.
(see above footnote)
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Lightning
Winter Storms
Subsidence
Drought
Earthquakes
Termites
Epidemics
Mold
Human-caused Hazards5
Hazardous materials spills
Nuclear accidents
Civil unrest
Terrorism
A section of the plan was created for each individual hazard and included the
hazard data and DRU Research Team and Advisory Committee’s findings throughout
the reassessment of the plan. This chapter assesses each hazard – what causes it and
the likelihood of occurrence. Another chapter was designed to review the impact of
these hazards on UNO (University of New Orleans Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2006).
With this background, the Committee members participated in a goal setting
exercise (see Appendix 1). Each member wrote down his or her five most important
goals. Each member then posted their selections, many of which were not listed on the
hand-out, and explained why they thought they were important. Much discussion
followed. One key concern that arose was that much of the damage that followed
Hurricane Katrina was not from “natural causes.” Much of the damage was caused by
looters and evacuees on campus and the subsequent mold that developed because
there were no plans, staff, or electricity to prevent the mold from growing in the
buildings. Also noted was the importance for the campus to reopen as quickly as
possible for the following reasons:
5

Human-caused hazards are defined as hazards caused by humans, whether accidental or intentional.
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─ Having staff on campus reduces the threat of damage by outsiders.
─ Reopening classes on campus helps UNO to retain its student population and
encourages students to continue their careers in Louisiana.
─ Reopening dormitories provides housing for many who would have to live
elsewhere, perhaps even in other states.
─ Reopening revenue producing activities, such as the Arena, the gym, and the
restaurants, brings money to campus, reducing the need for financial aid from the
State and Federal governments.
After the Advisory Committee reviewed the hazards, it developed goals to mitigate
their impacts. These are used to guide the planning and implementation of mitigation
activities and projects. The Committee agreed that the many recommended goals could
be organized under five general goal statements:
Goal 1. Protect the lives and health of the students, faculty and staff.
Goal 2. Reduce the exposure of the campus’ existing and future buildings, contents,
utilities, and infrastructure from damage by natural and human caused hazards. Pay
special attention to certain special resources on campus, including the Library,
student housing, and records.
Goal 3. Educate the students, faculty and staff on ways to protect themselves and
their property from damage by natural and human caused hazards.
Goal 4. Have the necessary emergency response facilities, equipment, staff, and
procedures in place to minimize the danger and damage to people and property
during an incident.
Goal 5. Have the disaster recovery facilities, equipment, staff, and procedures in
place to allow the campus to reopen immediately after an incident, with minimal
reliance on outside sources of assistance (University of New Orleans Hazard
Mitigation Plan, 2006).
Mitigation projects were identified by the Research Team, in consultation with the
Advisory Committee, to reach the DRU goals. A wide range of strategies were
considered that could positively affect the impact of the hazards, and developed
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alternatives. They are the subject of the remaining chapters in the plan, and are
organized under five general strategies for reaching the goals:
1.)
2.)
3.)
4.)
5.)

Property protection – e.g., relocation out of harm’s way, retrofitting
buildings
Preventive – e.g., restricted access to sensitive areas, securing power
plant
Emergency services – e.g., warning, response, evacuation
Structural projects – e.g., drainage improvements
Public information – e.g., outreach projects

After the alternatives were reviewed, the Research Team drafted an “action plan”
that specifies recommended projects, who is responsible for implementing them, and
when they are to be done. The action plan is included as the final chapter of the new
Hazard Mitigation Plan (University of New Orleans Hazard Mitigation Plan, 2006).

Conclusion
The use of multiple methods of data analysis in the case study of the
reassessment of the original UNO comprehensive campus mitigation plan post-disaster,
helped to increase validity of the overall plan. Upon completion of the process of
triangulation and data analysis, a final comprehensive campus mitigation plan was
developed that followed both the FEMA DRU guidelines and the FEMA community
mitigation plan guidelines. This enabled the University of New Orleans to be eligible to
receive future funding in support of post-Katrina recovery and pre-disaster mitigation
projects.
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS
Introduction
This case study was primarily conducted to describe the theories and processes
used to create an original all-hazards campus mitigation plan for the University of New
Orleans (UNO), as well as reassess the original plan post-Katrina. The study was
developed to explore the issues surrounding the creation of a campus-wide plan to
mitigate against natural and human-caused hazards, both before and after a disaster.
Based on these evaluations, a hazard profile was created after conducting a risk
assessment and holding individual interviews and focus group sessions. The result was
an original campus mitigation plan. On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the
City of New Orleans. Affects of this hazard are still ongoing. In light of the known
impacts for the University, the Research Team reassessed the original plan postdisaster. Based on the information formulated throughout the plan reassessment and
previous chapters of this thesis, conclusions and recommendations are presented in
this chapter.

In the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
There is no question that the University of New Orleans has been negatively
affected by Hurricane Katrina. On August 28, 2005, approximately 17,250 students
were attending UNO. After Katrina made landfall, the University’s main lakefront
campus remained closed for the rest of the fall semester. Classes were offered online,
with only about 8,000 students re-enrolling in the fall semester.
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The main campus re-opened in late January 2006, and a spring semester was
offered on-campus and online. The impacts from the storm were evident, with the
closure of several buildings, FEMA trailers covering the main and east campuses, and
even outdoor tents in which classes were held. Normal spring enrollment is
approximately 16,000 students. However, only about 11,600 students were attending
the newly re-opened University. Fall 2006 enrollment is projected to be between 14,000
and 15,000 students, which represents a decline in student tuition for the 2006-2007
fiscal year between $8.5 million and $12.5 million. In addition to these impacts, the
State of Louisiana cut UNO’s appropriate by nearly $6.5 million in 2005-2006 and has
announced no plans to restore its funding to its pre-Katrina levels. Therefore, the
University of New Orleans must plan to operate in 2006-2007 with $15-$19 million less
in revenue (Chancellor Timothy P. Ryan, 2006).
To deal with the fiscal distress, several faculty and staff members have already
been cut. The University developed a plan to restructure itself in accordance with this
budgetary shortfall. If and when the plan is submitted to and approved by the Board of
Supervisors, UNO plans to eliminate degrees in two undergraduate areas and graduate
areas. Seven other degree concentrations or tracks will be eliminated as well. Thus, the
restructuring plan will affect 5% of the degree programs and 2% of the academic
concentrations (Chancellor Timothy P. Ryan, April 8, 2006, personal email to UNO
faculty, staff and students).
Some of the staggering impacts from Hurricane Katrina could have been
mitigated by the creation and implementation of an all-hazards campus mitigation plan.
Instead of focusing on the negative impacts of Katrina and the lack of time required to
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properly create and implement the original mitigation plan before the storm, the original
plan was reassessed in light of the lessons learned post-disaster. Through proper
adoption and implementation of the new campus mitigation plan and utilization of FEMA
funding for mitigation projects, the University of New Orleans can better prepare itself
for any future natural or human-caused hazards.

Back-up Power
Many effects of Hurricane Katrina were caused and exacerbated by the inability
to access campus for several weeks post-landfall. As a result, the University developed
a mitigation project known as the North Campus Plant. This plant would house a backup generator, as well as emergency personnel and first-responders. The back-up
electrical power would mitigate against mold growth by regulating temperature and air
flow following the flooding of buildings, and also prevent a downed campus computing
and communications system. In addition, by having the campus monitored at all times
with the presence of the emergency personnel and first-responders, civil unrest could
be mitigated against. This would also allow for the immediate start of recovery
processes since people will be already be on campus. Therefore, the University should
promote this project and use any available funding from FEMA to construct this
mitigation measure.

Role of a Public University to the Community During a Disaster
This issue of the University’s role and responsibility to the community during a
disaster has also been questioned post-Katrina. Since the University of New Orleans is
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a State-owned facility, should it be a temporary shelter for evacuees? The looting and
intentional damage to the campus caused by evacuees and animals in search of high
ground, as well as the drop-off of rooftop rescues, dissuaded campus administrators
from promoting the use of UNO as a shelter. However, the University is high ground
during a severe flood, causing it to be an island of sorts. This cannot be changed, and
the resulting gathering of people to the University will likely happen again when another
event such as Hurricane Katrina occurs. Therefore, the University has considered
preparing itself for sheltering to help combat civil unrest.
The University should consider having on-site food and water supplies, as well as
bedding, to accommodate the flock of people that may once again seek shelter oncampus. By having food, water, bedding, and clothing readily available, perhaps looting
and unnecessary damage can be avoided. In addition, if and when the University
constructs the North Campus Plant, the presence of people on campus will help to
coordinate sheltering efforts as well as keep the population under control.

Sister-City Partnerships
To help ensure the continuation of services, the University should develop
“sister-city” partnerships. These partnerships should provide each University involved
with a back-up educational system and facility at another location for use following a
disaster. Faculty, staff, and students could be temporarily housed at the coordinating
facility in the event of a short-term evacuation. In the event of a long-term mandatory
evacuation and subsequent inability to return to campus, the University could operate
and provide its regular services from the sister-site, as well as remain housed there.
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The University of New Orleans could partner with another school within the LSU
system. However, other potential sister-city partners should be explored since this may
be too geographically limited in the case of a hurricane.

Review of Related Literature
As Burby (1999) argued, the ability to build capacity and collaboration within a
community, such as a disaster-resistant university, can further enhance and promote
the policies and procedures developed and implemented during the community’s
mitigation planning process. UNO’s undertaking of developing a comprehensive
mitigation plan gives the university the advantage of taking into account a broader array
of community goals, involving a large number of citizens, and of discovering the
potential for development and growth in less vulnerable areas. As Lunn theorizes
(2003), by involving many stakeholders and listening to their input, both covertly and
overtly, chances of community acceptability and prosperity are increased. The
collaborative model used by the University of New Orleans utilized in-house capabilities
and involved many stakeholders campus-wide. This collaborative model worked well for
UNO since the original plan had to be reassessed post-disaster. Instead of hiring
outside consultants to create the original plan, in-house expertise was used. Henstra’s
(2004) core concepts of ongoing disaster resilience as a philosophy, process, and a
condition and developing an adaptive capacity were taken into account throughout the
University of New Orleans’ mitigation planning and utilization of the collaborative model.
Henstra’s (2004) advice and UNO’s subsequent use of a capacity-building approach
proved to be successful, especially post-Katrina, when the plan had to be reassessed.
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Christian’s (2003) theory of participative education and Charvat’s (2005) theory
of extending public outreach initiatives to surrounding communities and area, provided
information that UNO used to promote substantial benefits by helping to link actions of
the policy and program together and keeping the stakeholders and public informed.
UNO’s inclusion of other community agencies and organizations helped to coordinate
mitigation efforts kept the faculty, staff, students, and public informed about its
mitigation measures. These entities also provided input about their own mitigation
plans, as well as feedback on the university’s plan, both of which proved to be beneficial
to the project.
Lessons learned and best practices found by researching other reassessments,
such as the Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project (CDMP, 1999), were used to provide
information for the revision of a pre-existing mitigation plan post-disaster. The period of
post-Katrina reconstruction, and the assessments that the period yielded (and
continues to do so) were used as a tool to make the university community more
disaster-resilient. As Ranganath (2000) argues, a major goal of mitigation is to yield
sustainable values throughout a community. Since a major goal of mitigation measures
is to make a community sustainable, it is necessary for land-use planning and hazard
mitigation projects to promote the avoidance of high-risk areas. Mitigation projects were
identified and land-use planning was refocused during the UNO disaster resistant
university initiative in order to promote campus sustainability.
The literature reviewed throughout this case study contributes greatly to the
University of New Orleans pre- and post-disaster mitigation planning. However,
theorists Burby (1999) and Henstra (2004) provided the most insightful theories
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regarding capacity-building and using a collaborative approach to the on-going process
of mitigation planning. As future natural and human-caused disasters unfold, the
continuous updating and revising of mitigation plans is essential, both from campus
experience as well as from examining other disasters throughout the country. Lessons
learned and best practices identified throughout mitigation measures can be used by
any university community to aid in the reassessment of their plan post-disaster, despite
whether or not that particular campus was directly impacted by the disaster. Overall,
mitigation planning should be performed by using a collaborative model and is an
ongoing process that must be reassessed often, especially in post-disaster times, to
ensure the sustainability of a community.
Implications for Future Research
Throughout this case study, issues have emerged in regards to ensuring disaster
resiliency in New Orleans. The actual utility of an all-hazards approach is questionable.
The most relevant hazards are often not given as much attention as should be the case
when trying to encompass all hazards that could possibly affect a community. In
addition, the most pertinent hazards are generally not developed thoroughly when trying
to cover so many issues. Emergency planners should reconsider the use of an allhazards approach in order to effectively examine disasters that may impact an area.
Other major catastrophes have developed throughout this study. Levee failure,
mold, termites, and civil unrest have all been introduced and added to the original
campus mitigation plan in high priority ranking (University of New Orleans Hazard
Mitigation Plan, 2006). These hazards were identified post-disaster. Their original
omission may also relate to the attempt to cover an all-hazards approach.
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Conclusion
The University of New Orleans has reassessed its original campus mitigation
plan in light of the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Several theories were referred
to while reassessing the plan, literature was reviewed, and interview and focus group
participants were revisited. As a result, new hazards were identified, old ones were reprioritized, and potential mitigation projects were developed. If the new all-hazards
campus mitigation plan is properly adopted and implemented, the University will have
the characteristics of a disaster-resilient community, and therefore be able to be
classified as a disaster-resistant university.
The impacts of Hurricane Katrina are still ongoing and the full effects will not be
known for years to come. However, as Chancellor Timothy P. Ryan (April 7, 2006,
personal email to UNO faculty, staff and students) states, “for a time, at least, like the
city in which it resides, UNO will be smaller. But it will be as educationally diverse as
always, and as we go forward, students, faculty and staff together, we will not just be as
good as we have been, but rather better than ever.” The University of New Orleans
Hazard Mitigation Plan (2006) is a key component for the University’s future and
triumph over disaster.
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Administration. She again attended the University of New Orleans, and decided to take
a Hazards Policy course because it seemed like an interesting elective. The course
description stated that the class would study natural and human-caused hazards
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that she worked on the Disaster Resistant University grant project, which is the topic of
this case study. Only two weeks after starting the Research Assistantship, Hurricane
Katrina struck the City of New Orleans. This emphasized the importance of the DRU
project and the mitigation of disasters in general. Ashley, like most people affected by
the storm, would always have a different perspective on the City she calls “home.”
She continued to work on the Disaster Resistant University project until being
hired as an Emergency Management Associate by the consulting firm, Innovative
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Emergency Management, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. There, she was able to utilize her
education and personal experiences to help others plan and prepare for disasters.
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